The Informal State and Its Predatory Appropriation of Resources: Patronal Presidentialism in Central Asia

This article takes its inspiration from the concept of patronal presidentialism, as defined by Henry Hale, in order to revisit the debate on neopatronalism through the case of the post-soviet states of Central Asia. The five countries combine, at different levels, a high concentration of political power, the control of the main economic resources by the presidential circle, and the myth of the father of the nation. The paper examines the relevance of the concept of patronal presidentialism by focusing on two of the criteria that define a neopatrimonial regime: the informal nature of operating of public administrative apparatuses, and mixed character, both “traditional” and “modern,” of these informal relations; and the influence of practices for harnessing resources used by the established elites. The notion of patronal presidentialism will maybe become the contribution of ‘post-sovietologists’ to the general debate on studies of political regimes.