Strategic and Economic Considerations in Arms Transfer Policies

In a globalizing arms market, characterized by intense competition and significant budgetary constraints, governments encourage military exports to support their defense industry. However, arms export policies differ considerably from one state to another, both in terms of the technologies transferred and of recipient countries. The article proposes a theoretical framework and a typology that combines domestic and international factors in explaining the variations of arms export policies among states. It seeks to show that the strategic and economic considerations at play in the making of arms export policies depend on a state’s position in the international hierarchy of arms producers and, at the domestic level, on the degree of export dependence of a state’s defense industry. The typology is then tested through a comparison of French and American arms export policies, based on interviews in Paris and Washington D.C. and on diplomatic cables leaked by Wikileaks. This article therefore aims to contribute both theoretically and empirically to an under-explored dimension of states’ external actions, at the frontier between strategic and economic interests, and to the understanding of the intertwining of external and internal dimensions of public policies, thereby also helping to bridge the study of international relations and comparative public policy analysis.