How the logic of proximity interferes with the deployment of public action: cross-views of development policies in two coca-producing regions

In Peru and Bolivia, agrarian development policies have been implemented for several decades with the aim of limiting coca cultivation, which in the regions of the Tropic of Cochabamba (Bolivia) and the Valley of the Apurimac, Ene and Mantaro Rivers (VRAEM, Peru) is mainly directed to illegal cocaine markets. However, these public policies, which are supposed to limit the drug trafficking economy, are mainly managed by the leaders of social organizations that defend the coca leaf culture in these regions. However, these public policies, which are supposed to limit the drug trafficking economy, are mainly managed by the leaders of social organizations that defend the coca leaf culture in these regions. Beyond this paradox and the perils of forms of "clientelism", this article questions how certain political exchanges impose themselves on public action and strengthen local networks, which in turn, by their proximity to the beneficiaries, partly legitimize public action in territories affected by the illegal economy. The comparison reveals two modalities of redistribution of public action: in the Bolivian region, it is a corporatist modality. Leaders are bound by the collective action of the union bases and the support of the MAS party. In the Peruvian region, it is an entrepreneurial modality. Leaders of the agricultural federation compete for the capture and distribution of public resources. These two processes have an impact on the relationship of the inhabitants to public policies and intermediaries: in their expectations of public policies, the inhabitants ask for the respect and the primacy of proximity logics, either by a reaffirmation of union autonomies in the Cochabamba Tropics, or by a form of mistrust towards the leaders in VRAEM, because of a strong political competition in a poorly transparent context.